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Abstract:  Trade preferences are a central issue in ongoing efforts to negotiate further 
multilateral trade liberalization. “Less preferred” countries are increasingly concerned about the 
discrimination they confront, while “more preferred” developing countries worry that WTO-based 
liberalization of trade will erode the value of current preferential access regimes. This tension 
suggests there is a political economy case for preference-granting countries to explicitly address 
erosion fears. We argue that the appropriate instrument for this is development assistance. The 
alternative of addressing erosion concerns through the trading system will generate additional 
discrimination and trade distortions, rather than moving the WTO towards a more liberal, non-
discriminatory regime. We argue that prospective losses generated by MFN liberalization should 
be quantified on a bilateral basis, using methods that estimate what the associated transfer 
should have been and ignoring the various factors that reduce their value in practice (such as 
compliance costs or the fact that part of the rents created by preference programs accrue to 
importers in OECD countries). Given that many poor countries have not been able to benefit 
much from preference programs, a case is also made that preference erosion should be 
considered as part of a broader response by OECD countries to calls to make the trading system 
more supportive of economic development. The focus should be on identifying actions and policy 
measures that will improve the ability of developing countries to use trade for development. 
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Non-reciprocal trade preferences have been long granted by developed countries to 
various developing countries. Historically, the pattern of these preferences reflected 
past colonial trade ties. In 1968, the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) recommended the creation of a ‘Generalized System of Preferences’ (GSP) 
under which industrialized countries would grant trade preferences to all developing 
countries on a non-reciprocal basis, not just to former colonies. Since then a plethora of 
non-reciprocal preferential access schemes have been put in place by OECD countries, 
in addition to an ever-expanding set of reciprocal bilateral and regional trade 
liberalization arrangements. Non-reciprocal schemes include national GSP programs, 
GSP+ programs for the least developed countries (LDCs) such as the EU Everything 
but Arms (EBA) initiative, and special arrangements for subsets of developing countries 
such as the Cotonou convention between the European Union (EU) and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the US African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), the US Caribbean Basin Initiative, etc. In practice, non-reciprocity is a bit of a 
misnomer as the preferential access is often conditional on non-trade-related actions or 
behavior by the recipient countries. 
Trade preferences are a central issue in ongoing efforts to negotiate further 
multilateral trade liberalization. Middle-income countries are increasingly concerned 
about the discrimination they confront in OECD markets as a result of the better access 
granted in these markets to other industrialized countries—because of free trade 
agreements—and to poorer or “more preferred” developing countries. Conversely, 
LDCs and non-LDC ACP countries worry that general, most-favored-nation (MFN)-
based liberalization of trade and removal of trade-distorting policies in agriculture by 
OECD countries will erode the value of current preferential access regimes. Such 
erosion has been ongoing for decades as a result of unilateral and multilateral reforms 
in preference-granting countries and the pursuit of regional trade agreements, with the 
attention given to the issue waxing or waning depending on the impacts of and changes 
to specific programs. The most recent example of a significant preference erosion shock 
was the implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on January 1,   2
2005, which confronted all countries with the prospect of much greater competition from 
the lowest-cost suppliers of textiles and apparel—especially China—as quantitative 
restrictions on exports were removed.
1 While this was not due to the removal of a 
program that was explicitly aimed at granting preferential access—instead, the aim was 
to restrain the most competitive suppliers—the effect was to give less competitive 
producers an advantage in contesting a highly restricted market.  
Determining the economic relevance of trade preferences in the context of WTO-
based multilateral liberalization—the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations—
requires both econometric assessments of the extent to which preference schemes are 
actually used (de facto as opposed to de jure preferences) as well as a numerical 
assessment of the monetary value of potential preference erosion associated with 
further WTO-based, nondiscriminatory tariff reductions. Preferences are designed to be 
an instrument to promote trade, both traditional and, more important, export 
diversification. By encouraging trade in sectors where there are rents, preferences 
induce specialization in those sectors. In addition, by raising returns, they also imply a 
financial transfer—an improvement in beneficiary countries’ terms of trade. While both 
dimensions are important, in our view the former predominates from an economic 
development perspective—after all, if the objective had been to transfer resources, it 
would have been more efficient to do so directly through aid.
2 
We argue that a key issue is to separate out the likely impact effects from erosion 
from the net overall effects that will result once policy responses by recipient countries 
and actions by the rest of the world are taken into account. Trade reforms by recipient 
countries and emerging market economies that do not grant preferential access have 
the potential to substantially attenuate the negative impact effects of erosion. In 
assessing the magnitude of the effects of erosion much will depend not only on the 
depth of OECD liberalization—e.g., the extent to which sectors such as sugar, beef or 
rice are opened up—but also on what other countries do. Much depends as well on 
whether developing countries benefiting from preferential access take actions to 
                                            
1 Preference receiving countries are also concerned about the potential negative terms of trade effects of 
multilateral liberalization insofar as this raises the price of their imports, especially of goods that currently 
benefit from subsidies and protection in OECD markets, by more than the price/quantity of their exports.  
2 Although aid may not be (have been) politically feasible. Political factors do affect policy choices, 
including the use of preferences. In this paper we focus on the economics of the issue.   3
improve the competitiveness and productivity of national firms and farmers. Here 
development assistance can play an important supporting role. 
As is often pointed out by economists, there are many sources of negative 
shocks that impose adjustment costs on countries, both trade and non-trade-related. 
Focusing on just one of these while ignoring others is generally difficult to justify. A 
premise of the paper is that a non-discriminatory trade regime and MFN-based 
liberalization by WTO members is a global public good, and that this justifies taking 
action to address this specific issue. This is not to deny preferences are not legitimate 
or to say that they do not benefit recipients—although our view is that they are less 
beneficial than is often held to be the case. However, they are distortionary and help 
generate increasing preferential trade in the world trading system as excluded (less-
preferred) countries confront incentives to negotiate reciprocal free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with major donor countries. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start in Section 1 with a brief review of 
the mechanics of preference programs. In Section 2 we summarize some of the recent 
estimates of the value of current programs. Section 3 turns to potential policy 
responses. We argue that from a “mercantilist” perspective of quantifying the magnitude 
of potential preference erosion what matters is to assess the loss of benefits stemming 
from the removal of a specific policy that has been put in place by OECD countries. 
From this perspective it is not relevant that developing countries might benefit as well 
from their own liberalization or that of other developing countries, or that such potential 
benefits may be quite substantial. However, from a development perspective identifying 
actions that would generate such benefits is critical, as is determining what the rest of 
the world—especially richer countries—can do to assist governments in poor countries 
to implement such measures. Section 4 presents a case that assistance for preference 
erosion should be considered as part of a broader response by OECD countries to calls 
to make the trading system more supportive of economic development. One reason for 
this suggestion is that erosion has been and will continue to be an ongoing process, 
with or without a Doha Round; more important is that many developing countries have 
not been able to benefit much from preferences. This suggests the focus should be on   4
identifying actions and policy measures that will improve the ability of developing 





1.  The mechanics of erosion 
It is helpful to start with a brief discussion of the basic mechanics of preferences and 
preference erosion.
3 Figure 1 represents an archetype OECD country importing 
varieties of good X from two suppliers, an LDC (SLDC) and a non-LDC (Snon-LDC). Trade 
preferences imply a reduction in the tariff applied to imports from the LDC. This 
increases LDC exports from XLDC,0 to XLDC,1, with associated benefits for the LDC 
exporter represented by area A.  There is also a concomitant shift in demand away from 
imports from the non-preferential supplier, resulting in a loss in exporter surplus equal to 
area B. The magnitude of the costs and benefits depend on supply and demand 
responsiveness to price changes, as well as the degree of substitution between 
preferential and non-preferential suppliers. The impact on the country granting the 
preferences depends on a mix of effects – terms of trade, trade creation, and trade 
diversion. For a beneficiary country preferences change the relative returns of 
producing a product – thus either promoting diversification or impeding it (as in the case 
of sugar or bananas). They also affect the overall terms of trade of the country, thus 
implying the equivalent of a net financial transfer. 
Trade preferences therefore involve a mix of benefits for preferential exporters, 
costs imposed on third-country exporters, and potential losses for the importer as well. 
Only if the (more) preferred country (countries) is (are) small in the sense of not at all 
affecting the internal price in the importing nation will there be no detrimental effect on 
third country competitors. If so, the preference only creates trade (expands imports), to 
the detriment of local suppliers in the preference granting country, but not to other 
foreign suppliers, as they continue to confront the same price.
4 Preference erosion 
                                            
3 What follows draws on Francois, Hoekman and Manchin (2005). 
4 See Baldwin and Murray (1977) for an early discussion. Most empirical studies conclude however that 
preference programs are associated with negative terms of trade effects for excluded (less preferred) 
countries, i.e., there is trade diversion as well as trade creation. Much depends on having good estimates 
of the elasticities of substitution between foreign and domestic goods and between foreign products of   5
involves the elimination of tariffs on the non-preferential supplier. This is shown in the 
bottom half of Figure 1. Elimination of the tariff on remaining third-country suppliers, 
given the duty free access already for preferential suppliers, means that third-country 
exporters see their exports increase from Xnon-LDC,1 to Xnon-LDC,2.  There is a gain in 
exporter surplus of area E, which may be greater or less than the original loss of 
exporter surplus resulting from the preferences, area B in the top part of Figure 1. The 
preferential supplier experiences a fall in demand for its exports from DLDC,1 to DLDC,2. 
This results in a partial, though generally not full, loss of the benefits from the original 
preference scheme. This is represented by area C, which is shown as being less than 
area A in the top half of Figure 1. The reason the loss is not complete is that 
preferences include, in part, the benefits relative to the original tariff-ridden equilibrium 
from a non-discriminatory tariff reduction by the importer. Preference erosion therefore 
generally yields a partial, not full, loss of the original benefits of the preference scheme. 
At the same time, third-countries recover some of the costs originally imposed by the 
preference scheme.  
  The foregoing ignores numerous important dimensions of reality.
5 First, 
preferences can only have an impact if there is a non-zero tariff in the importing market. 
Two-thirds of the major items Africa exports to Canada, for example, faced zero MFN 
tariffs even before the 2003 initiative in favor of LDCs. Similarly, 69 percent of EU 
imports from Africa (by value) in 2000 were in items facing zero MFN duties (Stevens 
and Kennan, 2004)—again, before EBA was introduced in 2001.  
  Second, there are general equilibrium effects to consider, especially the impact of 
changes in policies in other countries, both those that do and those that do not grant 
preferences. Such changes may affect demand and supply and thus world prices of the 
product concerned. Changes in overall (global) trade policies may also affect the relative 
returns of trading different products, create opportunities for exports that did not exist 
before, and so forth. 
                                                                                                                                             
different origin. Early studies assumed these elasticities were identical. General equilibrium studies by 
contrast tend to use Armington elasticities. For more discussion, see Brown (1987), Langhammer and 
Sapir (1987) and the references cited there.  
5 See for example the survey by Hoekman and Ozden (2005).   6
Third, compliance costs (paperwork, red tape, documenting origin, etc.) can be 
significant. The average estimate in the empirical literature is that documentary 
requirements imply costs of some 3-5 percent of the value of goods (Brenton and 
Manchin, 2003; Brenton and Ikezuki, 2004; Anson et al. 2003; Candau et al. 2004; 
Carrère and de Melo, 2004). This substantially reduces the actual benefits of trade 
preferences for developing countries as it requires MFN tariffs to exceed 4 percent on 
average for preferential access to be meaningful. Given that the average MFN tariff in 
OECD is only 4 percent or so, preferences can only matter where there are tariff peaks.  
Fourth, to the extent there is market power on the part of either 
importers/distributors (Francois and Wooton, 2005) or the transport and logistics sector 
(Francois and Wooton, 2001), the terms of trade benefits of preferential tariff reductions 
will be captured at least in part by those intermediaries with market power rather than the 
exporters (although any diversification benefits will remain). If preferences apply to highly 
protected sectors in donor countries, they will result in high rents for those able to export 
free of trade barriers. However, buyers will know the existence of these rents, and if they 
have the ability to set prices (have market power), the rents may predominantly be 
captured by distributors or other intermediaries (Tangermann, 2002). There is evidence, 
based on the AGOA preference scheme, that the pass through of preference margins is 
indeed partial at best. Olarreaga and Özden (2005) find that the average export price 
increase for products benefiting from preferences under AGOA was about 6 percent, 
whereas the average MFN tariff for these products was some 20 percent. Thus, on 
average exporters received around one-third of the tariff rent. Moreover, poorer and 
smaller countries tended to obtain lower shares—with estimates of the share of the loss 
ranging from a low of 13 percent in Malawi to a high of 53 percent in Mauritius.
6 In the 
case of market power, the result is a simple redistribution of the benefits of preferences: 
rents are transferred to importers. In the case of administration costs, however, the result 
is not redistribution but a deadweight loss (waste). 
Finally, for preferences to have value, the beneficiary countries need to have an 
export capacity in the products for which preferential access is granted. In practice, GSP 
                                            
6 See Ozden and Sharma (2004) for a similar analysis of the US CBI program. Francois and Wooton 
(2005) obtain similar size-dependent results in an analysis of the incidence of markups along the 
distribution chain.   7
programs may exclude products in which developing countries have a strong 
comparative advantage. Many low-income countries simply do not have the capacity to 
exploit preferences, either not having productive facilities at all or not being able to 
compete even with the price advantage offered by the preference due to internal 
transactions and operating costs. Preferences were conceived as instruments to assist 
countries with supply capacity to diversify and expand their exports. They have little 




2.  Estimates of the Impact of Erosion 
The available research suggests that erosion of all preferences, both GSP and the 
deeper more recent preferences such as EBA and AGOA, would have a substantial 
impact on some countries, especially those with high concentration of exports in heavily 
protected commodities. Relatively bigger impacts are concentrated in small island 
economies and a number of LDCs dependent on sugar, bananas and to a lesser extent 
garment exports (IMF, 2003; Stevens and Kennan, 2004). These are the commodities 
where protection and therefore preference margins are high. Of the LDCs, Cape Verde, 
Haiti, Malawi, Mauritania, and São Tomé and Príncipe are found to be the most 
vulnerable to preference erosion. Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) conclude that six 
middle-income countries—Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia—
would also be significantly affected, with predicted export declines ranging from 11.5 
percent for Mauritius to 7.8 percent for Fiji. The limited number and small size of most of 
the economies concerned imply that measures to help mitigate the impact of preference 
erosion need to be closely targeted at the countries at risk.
7  
The costs of preference erosion need to be set against gains from MFN 
liberalization–both for the recipient country and other developing and least developed 
countries. While LDCs do stand to lose from tariff reductions in sectors or products 
where preferences matter, they also stand to benefit from improved access to global 
                                            
7 The only large country expected to suffer from preference erosion is Bangladesh, which has benefited 
significantly from the textile quota restrictions imposed on other large competitive developing countries 
such as China, and which were removed at the end of 2004 under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing. However, as discussed below, these costs are already “sunk” in that the shock has already 
occurred.   8
markets. This at least partially, and often substantially, offsets the more direct losses 
from erosion of bilateral preference margins. Thus, preference erosion will be offset by 
the compensatory effect of broad-based multilateral liberalization, including by emerging 
market economies and by beneficiary countries themselves. However, research 
suggests that what matters most in terms of own reform by LDCs is the pursuit of 
complementary reforms and public investments that enhance the productivity of firms 
and farmers. Additional trade reforms on their own will not generate significant benefits 
in terms of poverty reduction (World Bank and IMF, 2005). 
Finally, implementation and transition periods also matter, as does the depth and 
scope of the reforms. Total erosion is unlikely to happen in a short span—and any MFN 
reforms will be implemented gradually over several years. What follows briefly 
discusses some recent studies that quantify the potential income effects of preference 
erosion.
8 Focusing on the LDCs and using a global general equilibrium model and the 
latest version of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database that incorporates 
data on the major OECD preference programs (Bouet et al. 2004), Francois, Hoekman 
and Manchin (2005) conclude that complete preference erosion due to MFN reforms in 
the EU—including in agriculture—would impose a welfare (real income) loss of some 
$460 million on African LDCs and an additional $100 million on Bangladesh. This 
assumes away compliance costs. Limão and Olarreaga (2005) also undertake an 
analysis of the welfare effects of complete preference erosion. They calculate what the 
income transfer to LDCs would need to be so as to be equivalent to the transfer implied 
by existing preference programs. They conclude that for LDCs the figure is $266 million. 
This is a one-year, short-run effect—all else equal the net present value will be several 
times higher. This brings their results in line with those of Francois, Hoekman and 
Manchin (2005), although the results are not strictly comparable given that Limão and 
Olarreaga use partial equilibrium methods. 
Using a variety of techniques, Grynberg and Silva (2004) estimate the losses in 
income transfers to producers in trade-preference-dependent economies at $1.7 billion 
                                            
8 Much of the literature focuses on trade effects—see e.g., IMF (2003) and Alexandraki and Lankes 
(2004). Our interest here is on the magnitude of the implied financial transfers as that provides the most 
straightforward measure of the value of preferences. This is not to argue that such transfers were the 
primary objective of preference programs. We return to the implications of this objective for policy 
responses to erosion in section 4 below.   9
annually. They argue that producers will require 14 to 20 years to adjust, implying a total 
net present value of losses ranging from $6 billion to $13.8 billion. An important feature 
of this analysis is that it includes the impacts of abolishing quotas on exports of textiles 
and clothing. This accounts for $1.1 billion of the total of $1.7 billion loss estimate. Van 
der Mensbrugghe (2005) concludes that existing preferences generate an additional 
$1.6 billion in income for low-income developing countries, as compared to a 
counterfactual MFN-only regime. Here also the inclusion of ATC quota rents accounts for 
a major portion of the benefits. In contrast, the erosion of ATC quota rents is included in 
the baseline scenario in François, Hoekman and Manchin (2005). Francois et al. note 
that the ATC abolition imposes erosion costs on negatively affected developing countries 
that are some 10 times larger than the potential overall erosion of remaining preferences 
under a Doha Round. The estimated losses reflect a combination of greater competition 
from China and loss of quota rents. To some extent this erosion has already been 
incurred, as liberalization of quotas started at the end of the Uruguay Round.
9  
If the analysis centers on preference erosion in the broader context of potential 
tariff reduction by all OECD—or all WTO members, including developing countries—the 
magnitude of the total erosion loss is generally reduced. This reflects the fact that the 
EU has been the most aggressive in using preferences as a tool for development 
assistance and that it is also the entity that has the most extensive trade-distorting 
policies in a key sector for poor countries: agriculture. Preference programs in other 
OECD countries have tended to be subject to greater exceptions (an example is the 
non-inclusion of apparel in US GSP programs). Thus, the gains associated with MFN 
tariff reductions by non-EU OECD countries will partially offset losses due to EU 
liberalization. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, Francois, Hoekman and Manchin 
(2005) conclude that overall losses will be reduced by a factor of four—to $110 million, 
while low-income countries in Asia stand to gain.  
If compliance costs are also considered in the analysis, the incidence and 
magnitude of preference erosion changes further, as such costs vary across 
                                            
9 ATC restrictions implicitly favoured smaller, higher-cost developing country suppliers at the expense of 
exports from China. While implementation of the ATC was staged, the major importing countries heavily 
back loaded implementation, resulting in a much greater than necessary adjustment shock at the end of 
the 10-year transition period than was necessary.   10
commodities. For Bangladesh, which is specialized in high tariff categories like clothing 
that are subject to restrictive rules of origin, including compliance costs substantially 
reduces the magnitude of potential erosion. For Madagascar, potential losses turn into 
potential gains. For countries specialized in agriculture – Malawi and Zambia for 
example – the effects of accounting for compliance costs are much smaller given the 
finding in the literature (e.g., Stevens and Kennan, 2004; Candau et al. 2004) that such 
costs are not a big issue.  
Ignoring compliance costs and the distribution of rents, estimates of total 
preference erosion losses for low-income countries are in the range of $500-$1.7 billion, 
with much depending on whether the ATC is included in the analysis or not.
10 The 
magnitude of estimates of preference erosion from even an ambitious Doha round tend 
to be less than the erosion that is associated with elimination of textile and clothing 
quotas on developing country exports. For example, Francois, Spinanger and Woertz 
(2005) find that the removal of textile restrictions is detrimental for sub-Saharan Africa, 
although the impact is smaller than for Asian countries such as India and Vietnam. 
However, the ATC-induced negative impact on Africa is smaller than the estimates of 
the potential magnitude of Doha Round preference erosion found by Francois, 
Hoekman and Manchin (2005) if no account is taken of compliance costs. If such costs 
are considered—which they estimate to average 4 percent—the potential Doha trade 
preference losses are smaller than those associated with lifting of ATC textile and 
clothing quotas. One reason is that the rents associated with the latter were equivalent 
to tariffs well above any realistic threshold value of compliance costs.  
The importance of the quantitative impacts of the ATC illustrate the point that a 
variety of policy and non-policy-induced shocks will impact on countries almost 
continuously—reflecting the global business cycle, changes in consumer tastes, the 
development of new technologies, natural disasters, etc. These call for social safety 
nets and government policies to help firms and households adjust and benefit from new 
opportunities. The types of shocks and adjustment pressures generated by changes in 
global trade policies will often be smaller in magnitude than those generated by other 
                                            
10 Figures are higher if the focus extends to middle income countries, some of which—e.g., Mexico—
stand to suffer potentially substantial losses as preferential access to the US and Canada is eroded. The 
focus in this paper is primarily on low-income, weak and vulnerable economies.   11
forces. They also will be realized gradually, given that trade reforms are generally 
implemented over a number of years. These considerations have implications for the 
design of a policy response to erosion. 
 
3.  Possible Policy Responses 
The bottom line we take from the extant literature is that taking into account supply 
capacity constraints, the costs of satisfying documentary requirements, the fact that 
rents will be shared with intermediaries in the importing country, and the potential 
offsetting effects of own reform and that of other developing countries, the aggregate 
magnitude of erosion will be limited. However, the stand-alone impact of the removal of 
preferential access to the most distorted markets (those in the EU) will be significant for 
a relatively small number of countries for which a small number of tariff lines are 
important. This then raises the question from a policy perspective whether the focus 
should be on the overall economic net effects taking into account possible (feasible) 
policy responses, or whether the focus should be on the loss incurred in those markets 
where preferences matter, ignoring any possible offsetting effects.  
  Both perspectives are relevant. The first focal point is the appropriate one from a 
development perspective—clearly it is very important to identify what governments can 
do to attenuate any negative effects of global MFN liberalization. Indeed, part of the 
policy response by donors (those who granted the preferences) should be to assist 
recipient country governments put into place measures that will enhance the ability of 
firms and farmers in poor countries to exploit trade opportunities and compete with 
imports. It is also the focal point of the WTO process, as negotiations involve give and 
take, the objective of each member being to maximize a net overall gain. 
The second focal point is a metric of the magnitude of erosion of benefits that 
stem from removal of a specific policy put in place by OECD countries. From this 
perspective it is not relevant that there are other sources of offsetting market access 
and/or terms of trade gains—be it from liberalization by other developing countries or 
own liberalization. What matters is the impact effect of removal of the non-reciprocal 
access to specific protected markets. In terms of Figure 1, for a given product (tariff 
line), the value of this transfer can be represented by area C. The value of total erosion   12
is then the sum over all the products for which the country has been granted preferential 
access. (If MFN reforms are partial, the loss will be smaller). Note that this assumes 
away any positive externalities from expanded export production—i.e., the focus is only 
on the terms of trade effect. Insofar as countries could/did not benefit (have exports), 
there will be no loss on this measure. This is an important dimension of the preference 
erosion question to which we return below. 
This is not to imply that offsetting actions should not be encouraged, as this is in 
the interest of the developing countries directly affected by MFN liberalization in the 
OECD. Indirectly, such actions are in the interest of all countries (all WTO members). 
Global liberalization and a shift away from discriminatory trade policies will bolster the 
trading system and help generate welfare improvements for the world as a whole. 
These considerations suggest a two-pronged approach that involves additional financial 
assistance, determined by a quantification of the direct, bilateral erosion losses current 
recipients of preferences will incur (the sum of all areas C in Figure 1), with funding 
allocated towards measures that will reduce the negative economic effects of this 
erosion.
11 
Various approaches can be identified in responding to preference erosion losses. 
One is to seek compensation within the trade negotiating agenda—i.e., take actions that 
will improve market access and the terms of trade of the targeted countries. This can 
involve non-liberalization of products that are of greatest value from a preference point 
of view. It could even entail raising tariffs on products insofar as these are not bound 
under the WTO, although raising trade barriers in order to increase the value of 
preferential access would be globally welfare reducing. More common is the argument 
used by vested interests in the OECD that preferred developing countries should not 
lose any more preferential access to their (highly distorted) markets and that further 
MFN reform should be avoided. The result is the potential for status quo bias reflecting 
a “bootlegger-Baptist” coalition between these protectionist interests and developing 
country governments. This would impose a significant opportunity cost from a global 
efficiency perspective. 
                                            
11 Another question is whether any assistance should be temporary or longer-term. From an adjustment 
viewpoint the former is appropriate; from a development perspective a case can be made that the 
duration of assistance should be conditional on development of competitive export capacity.   13
It is not easy to identify trade-based solutions that are consistent with the MFN 
principle while appropriately targeting those countries that are most affected by the 
erosion of preferences. A recent proposal to address the erosion issue by converting 
bilateral preferences into equivalent bilateral import subsidies comes close. As argued 
by Limão and Olarreaga (2005), this would preserve both the trade-based nature of the 
assistance and its bilateral (discriminatory) nature, while still implying a multilateral 
solution. They show that an import subsidy scheme would be welfare superior to trade 
preferences—indeed, it would be a Pareto improvement, making all WTO members 
better off, as it would allow deeper MFN liberalization to occur. However, this solution is 
premised on continued acceptance by WTO members of exceptions to MFN—i.e., it 
implies continued discrimination across trading partners.  
Other options “within” the trading system are to expand preferential access to 
major emerging markets, to reduce the costs of rules of origin—through harmonization 
towards the most liberal common denominator (Commission for Africa, 2005), and to 
provide discriminatory access in other areas—e.g., better access for mode 4 under the 
GATS. The latter is already occurring on a bilateral basis, outside the WTO, as reflected 
in special arrangements or relationships between OECD members and specific 
developing countries. In our view efforts to move down such discriminatory paths in the 
WTO are not desirable. Indeed, we would argue that a major objective or rationale for 
seeking to shift away from using preferential trade as a form of aid is that it undermines 
the fundamental principle of non-discrimination as well as create incentives to impede 
MFN liberalization (Limão, 2005).  
Of course, non-discriminatory solutions could also be pursued within the trading 
system. An example would be to target MFN liberalization on goods and services 
developing countries have a comparative advantage in. Another is to ensure that MFN 
liberalization proceeds gradually to allow for adjustment to occur of a number of years. 
Yet another would be to rewrite rules so that that they benefit poor countries more, even 
if it comes at the expense of rich country interests. Much of what is discussed in the 
WTO under the heading of “special and differential treatment” and implementation of 
negotiated commitments revolves around perceptions that the existing rules are not fully 
supportive of development prospects. A willingness to address these concerns could   14
help to offset preference erosion losses. Indeed, there is a case for pro-active policies to 
address market failures that help result in weak trade capacity. Trade policies are 
unlikely to be effective or appropriate, but some of these policies may be subject to 
WTO rules or be the subject of proposed disciplines (e.g., subsidies of various kinds). 
These may provide a rationale for greater “flexibility” in the application of disciplines—in 
particular greater acceptance of a process that relies on monitoring and transparency of 
policy more than on rigid enforcement of common rules.
12 
In what follows, we limit attention to the second broad approach that can be 
taken to respond to preference erosion losses incurred by developing countries: through 
development assistance. In our view a major reason for pursuing this avenue is that the 
research summarized above finds that in monetary terms the primary negative impact of 
erosion follows from the removal of specific trade barriers in specific OECD countries. 
That is, the erosion problem is primarily a bilateral issue that should be resolved on a 
bilateral basis, in the sense that those imposing the costs should bear the burden of 
offsetting them. This is not to deny that preferences are a WTO concern—the system of 
bilateral preferences has multilateral consequences. This is another reason to pursue a 
solution outside the trading system—in practice we do not see feasible WTO-based 
solutions that are not distortionary. Any solution should therefore have a multilateral 
component. As the pursuit of bilateralism in the allocation of assistance would be 
inefficient, a multilateral approach that builds on existing instruments is desirable. 
Moreover, given the objective of preferences—export development—arguably the focus 
should also be on the attainment of that goal. 
Existing Mechanisms for International Adjustment Financing 
A number of initiatives have been taken in recent years to assist countries better exploit 
trade opportunities and deal with adjustment pressures. These include the Integrated 
Framework for Trade-Related Assistance (IF) and the IMF’s Trade-Integration 
Mechanism (TIM). In addition to these trade-specific initiatives, multilateral development 
banks support trade-related investments and provide technical assistance when 
requested by client governments. While such assistance has been expanding in both 
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absolute and relative terms—see World Bank and IMF (2005)—these institutions do not 
provide earmarked funding for trade adjustment purposes.  
The IMF’s Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) is an example of one possible 
approach to addressing preference erosion costs. It was developed to help countries 
expecting short-tem balance of payments difficulties in coping with the effects of 
multilateral liberalization (IMF, 2004). The TIM is intended to address not only preference 
erosion but also covers instances such as balance of payments shortfalls as a result of 
ATC quota integration and the possible impact on net food importing developing 
countries of higher food import prices. The TIM is not a new facility but operates through 
existing IMF instruments. This ensures that the impact of possible adjustment costs 
resulting from specific shocks such as preference erosion is considered and placed in 
the context of a country’s overall macroeconomic policy framework. The usual IMF policy 
conditionality and terms and costs of lending apply. Therefore the impact of assistance 
on a country’s external debt burden would need to be taken into account.   
The Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Assistance focuses much more on 
the “structural” agenda as opposed to dealing with short-term macroeconomic impacts of 
external shocks. The IF brings together the key six multilateral agencies working on 
trade development issues—the IMF, the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD, the UN 
Development Programme, WTO and the World Bank—and 17 bilateral donors (including 
Canada, the EU, Japan and the USA). The basic purpose is to embed a trade agenda 
into a country’s overall development strategy, usually the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
paper (PRSP). The process starts with a diagnostic analysis. This assessment looks at a 
number of issues, including the complementary policy agenda necessary to support 
successful trade reform, and generates a proposed action matrix of prioritized trade-
related capacity building and assistance needs that are linked to the country’s overall 
development strategy. 
To a large extent the philosophy behind the IF mechanism mirrors the intentions 
of what is now known as the “new aid framework” to improve harmonization between the 
providers of trade assistance (both bilateral and multilateral) and place trade within the 
context of a country’s overall development strategy (Prowse, 2002). The majority of 
LDCs (over forty) have applied for assistance under the scheme. A small trust fund   16
finances the trade assessments and small scale technical assistance arising from the 
action matrices. The larger identified and prioritized trade capacity building plans are 
presented within the context of Consultative Group meetings and Round Tables 
associated with the PRSP process where donors (both multilateral and bilateral) are 
asked to make pledges. This allows bilateral and multilateral donors to respond to each 
country’s identified needs in a systematic and coherent manner, according to 
comparative advantage and preference. In addition bilateral donors can continue to 
contribute bilaterally, or choose to provide resources through multilateral organizations. 
Either way it reduces the duplication and proliferation of vertical initiatives. However 
given an “aid resource constrained environment,” prioritized trade action plans have had 
to compete, justifiably, with other priority sectors (namely health, education). To date, 
implementation on the ground in prioritized trade areas has been limited. 
A Stand-Alone Compensation Fund? 
Neither of these existing mechanisms directly addresses the concerns of developing 
countries regarding preference erosion. The TIM involves loans, and implies therefore 
that the costs of adjustment to erosion will be borne by the countries that lose 
preferential access to markets. Moreover, the focus is on the short term, 
macroeconomic effects—that is the net effects taking into account all policy changes 
and responses, not just the removal of preferential access. Thus, there is no element of 
“offsetting” the losses incurred—the bilateral nature of the problem is ignored. The IF 
focuses purely on the national trade-related agenda of LDCs. While funding of priorities 
will have a large grant component—in contrast to the TIM—there is no guarantee that 
trade projects will be financed, as there is no earmarking of funds or specific allocations 
for countries. 
The most direct and simplest solution would be for donor countries to agree to 
directly compensate developing countries for preference erosion incurred as a result of 
MFN trade reforms (Page, 2004; Page and Kleen, 2004). This would both help realize 
the potential global efficiency and welfare gains associated with an ambitious Doha 
Round outcome, and directly offset associated impact losses for developing countries. 
Page and Kleen (2004) argue that as global liberalization is a public good, it would be 
incorrect to consider the associated compensation as aid. They therefore propose that a   17
compensation fund be housed at the WTO. How donor countries would provide 
resources would be a matter of “choice”, although the level of contributions would be 
determined by various criteria (for example share of trade, income, past commitments 
and use of preferences). Given that the funds would be regarded as compensation for 
the removal of a prior benefit, funding would be allocated without conditions to 
beneficiary countries according to the estimation of loss of preferences. The fund would 
need to be secure, leading Page and Kleen to argue that voluntary commitments need to 
be made ‘legally irrevocable’. 
Grynberg and Silva (2004) have made a similar proposal. They suggest the 
establishment of a Special Fund for Diversification (SFfD) to mitigate the impact of the 
erosion of preferences due to MFN liberalization. A distinct feature of this proposal is that 
financing (from pooled donor funds) “commensurate with preference losses” would be 
provided for private sector-led export diversification investments. A share of SFfD funds 
would be set aside for a private sector window to facilitate investment start-up expansion 
by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), restructuring or rehabilitation in non-
traditional sectors. Remaining funds would be provided for a public sector window for 
enabling infrastructure investments, as well as for optional technical assistance and 
social safety net windows. The emphasis on the private sector as a recipient of 
preference loss compensation funds would go some way to addressing a specific aspect 
of preference programs—that they directly benefit exporters. Under the Commonwealth 
Secretariat proposal this constituency would have the prospect of some direct 
compensation. 
Another option has been suggested by the UN Millennium Taskforce on Trade 
(2004), which argues that one element of a solution could involve income support 
programs for farmers and producers of specific goods that have benefited from high 
rates of protection. While such programs are targeted at the domestic  producers of 
preference granting countries and are intended to be a vehicle to facilitate a shift away 
from production support, negatively affected producers in developing countries that 
benefited from preferential access could also be assisted by including them in the 
support program. Elements of this approach reportedly will be pursued in the new EU 
sugar regime. It could be extended to other highly distorted markets where preferences   18
matter and where producers will confront adjustment costs as market price supports are 
lowered. There is an obvious political economy rationale for such programs, and 
extending support to affected producers in developing countries would also take 
seriously the arguments made by groups in OECD countries that continued preferences 
(and thus market price support) are needed to assist producers in developing countries. 
However, it should be recognized that support for affected firms may not benefit the 
country insofar as the firms are foreign and/or do not diversify or invest in the country 
concerned. 
All of these types of programs and mechanisms raise equity concerns in that 
those who have benefited the most from preferences are not necessarily the poorest or 
most vulnerable. Indeed, by definition the assistance will be granted to those who have 
been most able to benefit from preferences. Within recipient countries, some of these 
beneficiaries will be located among the higher income groups in society, raising equity 
considerations. The suggestions for a preference erosion fund of some kind go against 
the emerging wisdom on improving aid effectiveness and enhancing international policy 
coherence (IMF and World Bank, 2004). Leaving aside the issues of quantification of 
losses, there is no doubt that the adjustment costs arising from preference erosion must 
be addressed. However, establishing a separate fund targeted at one specific structural 
adjustment need and a specific set of countries runs counter to a more harmonized 
approach to development assistance. Adjustment to MFN liberalization will also affect 
many that have not benefited from preferences but are located in highly protected 
domestic industries and sectors, for example. They will also require assistance to adjust. 
In general, the shocks that regularly confront countries can be expected to exceed those 
associated with preference erosion for most countries. The need to diversify is not 
unique to economies that have benefited from preferences but is common to numerous 
countries, notably those with a narrow export base.  
Evidence by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) suggests that countries at very early 
stages of development experience a positive relationship between export (production) 
diversification and growth. However, the experience with schemes aimed at promoting 
export diversification is mixed, with numerous examples of programs that do no more 
than entrench already inefficient industrial and production patterns. While this is not to   19
deny the case for government support to address market failures or the case for “policy 
flexibility”—see e.g., Rodriguez-Clare (2004), Rodrik (2004), Pack and Saggi (2005), 
Hoekman (2005)—in our view funding must be provided within the context of an overall 
country development program and a broad macroeconomic policy framework to realize 
the dynamic gains associated with MFN liberalization.
13 As a development tool stand-
alone specific funds and associated mechanisms are unlikely to find widespread support 
among donors and recipient countries insofar as they are not integrated into national 
poverty reduction and development strategies. This applies a fortiori to suggestions to 
place a compensation fund in the WTO, which is neither a development nor financial 
agency. Placing a funding mechanism for trade adjustment associated with preference 
erosion in the WTO would change the role of the organization. 
 
4.  Addressing Erosion Costs as Part of the Case for Aid for Trade  
As noted, export diversification and development was the primary motivation for 
preferences. Many countries in the past have benefited from preferential access and 
have graduated from bilateral programs, and others continue to benefit. But many of the 
poorest countries have not managed to use preferences to diversify and expand exports. 
Given the systemic downsides, limited benefits, and historical inability of many poor 
countries in Africa and elsewhere to use preferences, a decision to shift away from 
preferential “trade as aid” toward more efficient and effective instruments to support poor 
countries could both improve development outcomes and help strengthen the multilateral 
trading system (Hoekman, 2004). Tariffs are just a part of the overall set of factors 
constraining developing country exports—other variables include transport and 
transactions costs that are often much higher per unit of output than in more developed 
countries. With or without preferences, more effective integration of the poorest countries 
into the trading system requires instruments aimed at improving the productivity and 
competitiveness of firms and farmers in these countries. Supply constraints are the 
primary factors that have constrained the ability of many African countries to benefit from 
                                            
13 This is an aid policy perspective. As noted below, trade negotiators are likely to have a different view, 
suggesting a case for temporary earmarking of funding.   20
preferences.
14 This suggests that the main need is to improve trade capacity and 
facilitate diversification. In part this can be pursued through a shift to more (and more 
effective) development assistance that targets domestic supply constraints as well as 
measures to reduce the costs of entering foreign markets.  
The case for trade support extends beyond preference erosion 
A Doha reform package can be expected to generate sizeable gains to both developed 
and developing countries. The overall magnitudes of such gains are difficult to assess 
accurately—much depends on what is agreed and how it is implemented, and how 
much of the gains are transferred to compensate domestic losers—through expanded 
income support, for example. However, even under the most conservative estimates, 
the aggregate global gains will be significant. In absolute terms developed countries will 
gain more than developing countries, providing the means to engage in increased 
support and development assistance. Such support is needed as the consequent trade 
liberalization will require adjustment and the pursuit of concomitant policy reforms and 
public investments to bolster trade capacity. What is important is recognition of need 
(additional resources for trade adjustment and integration) against the potential global 
benefits arising from further multilateral liberalization—a global public good.  
In undertaking trade reform and to participate effectively in the global trading 
system, poorer countries are faced with a gamut of economic and political concerns. On 
the economic side, there are adjustment costs that will arise before offsetting 
investments are realized in other (new) sectors. Preference erosion is just one element 
of these costs. Some countries may confront deterioration in their terms of trade (e.g., 
some net food importers). Countries where tariff revenues make up a significant 
proportion of total fiscal resources will need to undertake tax reform. Adjustment costs 
are a function of policy changes—as mentioned previously, those associated with 
preference erosion will be gradual and tariffs are just a part of the cost function facing 
exports. A fundamental issue is that many of the poorest developing countries are ill 
equipped to take full advantage of (new) trade opportunities due to supply side, 
administrative capacity and institutional constraints. Improved market access without 
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the ability to supply export markets competitively is not much use. Gains from trade 
liberalization are conditional on an environment that allows the mobility of labor and 
capital to occur, that facilitates investment in new sectors of activity—requiring, among 
other factors, an efficient financial system, good transportation/logistics services, etc. 
Inevitably for most poor countries this requires complementary reforms prior to and in 
conjunction with the trade reforms.  
On the political side, even accepting that trade is likely to generate global gains, 
the distributive and re-distributive dimensions of trade integration need to be taken into 
account if the political viability of the process is to be assured. Providing sizeable 
assistance has historically been of considerable importance in helping persuade 
countries of the benefits of integration. It played a significant role in building support the 
liberalization measures undertaken as part of the creation of the European Economic 
Community and common market. The post-war Marshall Plan was instigated in large 
measure to neutralize the forces moving Western Europe away from multilateral trade 
and to thereby facilitate global economic recovery.  
Recognizing the importance of complementary policy actions and the need for 
support for adjustment and integration to achieve successful trade reform in low-income 
economies does not imply that the Doha Round should be any less ambitious or 
deliberately slowed. The reverse is true. Moving ahead multilaterally on a non-
discriminatory basis will do most to help development. Trade reform undertaken in 
conjunction with concomitant “behind the border” policy measures and investments has 
significant potential to generate additional trade opportunities that would help lift a large 
number of people out of poverty (UN, 2004; World Bank and IMF, 2005). But it should 
be complemented by actions to redistribute some of the global gains to help address to 
trade and growth agenda in the poorest countries and make this more of a priority in aid 
programs—in the process helping to attain the original objective motivating preferential 
access regimes. 
Integrating preference erosion into a broader “aid for trade” initiative 
Supporting trade adjustment and integration requires a shift towards more efficient 
transfer/assistance mechanisms that target priority areas defined in national   22
development plans and strategies. When developing countries choose to make trade a 
part of their development strategies, donors should ensure that support is provided to 
enable developing countries to respond to the opportunities which trade liberalization 
and integration can bring. As discussed at greater length in Prowse (2005), arguably 
options for trade support need to be considered within the emerging “new aid 
framework” under which aid management and implementation practices are aligned with 
country policies and programs and bilateral and multilateral efforts are 
coordinated/harmonized.  
With respect to trade support, two issues are particularly pertinent. First, no one 
agency has effective authority to respond to all the needs for trade adjustment and 
integration, and therefore a system needs to be designed to harmonies more carefully 
existing processes around a country’s development plans. Secondy, providing 
resources for adjustment and integration to benefit from a multilateral trade round 
requires greater coherence between the development needs of countries and the 
requirements of the WTO rules based system.  
The Integrated Framework has become an established mechanism that provides 
a programmatic approach to assistance for trade adjustment and integration within the 
context of a country’s development program. To date it has relied on the consultative 
group and round table pledging sessions to finance adjustment needs and capacity 
building. As already noted, given that consideration of trade and investment activities 
within the PRSPs must compete with other sectors, the trade dimension has been 
relatively limited. Without additional assistance, one can question the efficacy of the 
program to provide a more enabling process of integration into the global trading 
system. Thus, more resources are needed to provide a sustained effort to identify, 
prepare and implement a coherent trade, investment and growth strategy in-country 
within the context of a country’s development process, and to address identified trade 
adjustment costs and capacity building needs.  
There are numerous operational questions that will need to be resolved in terms 
of how additional funding might be managed through a mechanism that builds on the IF 
framework—these are discussed in Prowse (2005). The key is to mobilize such 
additional funding, the magnitude of which will affect the design of any allocation   23
mechanism. The prospect of preference erosion provides one compelling rationale for 
increased assistance to offset the associated losses, as well as an avenue through 
which to increase available funding for trade priorities.  
Specifically, a binding commitment could be sought through which preference 
giving countries/trading blocs accept to transfer the assessed value of current 
preference programs in the form of financial aid. This implies that assistance would be 
specific for each beneficiary country.
15 If such an approach is pursued, rather than 
establishing a separate fund and a parallel institutional structure, ideally the 
commitments for each beneficiary country should be disbursed through the consultative 
group and round table processes through which aid is allocated, on the basis of the 
framework described above that places trade needs within a country’s overall 
development program. In terms of quantifying the value of preferences, in principle, as 
argued above, there is a (political economy) case that the transfer would need to be the 
equivalent of the bilateral “partial equilibrium” value of preferences received. That is, the 
quantification exercise – which will need to be performed through an independent 
arbitration type exercise – would ignore the general equilibrium effects of changes in 
other countries policies or the country’s own policy stance.  
While apparently attractive, it is important to recognize that in practice such an 
approach toward preference erosion is both narrow and potentially difficult to 
implement. Recall the earlier discussion of the studies attempting to estimate the value 
of preferences/potential losses. Much depended on whether the ATC was included or 
not. Should the effects of the ATC be ignored? Some might argue it should be—that this 
is “water under the bridge” as it was negotiated as part of an overall Uruguay Round 
agreement. Moreover, there is of course a major difference in that in the case of the 
ATC the focus of policy was not to benefit some countries but to restrict some exporters 
(protect import-competing firms).  
Seeking to agree on a methodology to quantify potential erosion losses clearly 
embodies the danger of lengthy negotiations and disagreements on the question of 
what the domain of the analysis should be. In addition to the ATC one can consider the 
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conclusion of FTAs, the effects of unilateral liberalization, etc. Should these also be 
covered? Whatever one’s views on whether the Uruguay Round was a balanced 
package and the desirability of FTAs, the fact is that industries and households around 
the developing world confront adjustment costs as a result of past policy decisions and 
will continue to do so. Moreover, as noted previously, countries regularly confront 
numerous other shocks that are/will be of greater magnitude than erosion. 
If a specific focus is maintained on preference erosion, we would argue this 
should be restricted to future losses caused by MFN liberalization as a result of the 
Doha Round.
16 Although it must be recognized that any outcome will be negotiated and 
that there will be other areas through which countries will seek to improve the overall 
outcome, the political economy rationale for this is that it will help support a more 
ambitious outcome in terms of MFN liberalization, which is beneficial for all WTO 
members and an important systemic reason for addressing preference erosion 
concerns. There is then also a case to earmark funds on a country basis. Although 
earmarking is generally not regarded as good aid policy, there is a compelling reason to 
impose this constraint in the case of preference erosion as the magnitudes of the 
associated losses vary significantly across countries. However, if this is done it is 
important that funding be disbursed in the context of an overall development program of 
policy and support. 
Of course, this will do little for those countries that have not been able to benefit 
from preferences. The assistance needs of these countries in the trade area clearly are 
much greater than any estimate of the value of current preferences. Although the 
proposed methodology for quantifying the required transfers from donors will result in 
“upper bound” estimates of the value of preference programs—which is arguably 
appropriate from a political economy standpoint—the overall numbers involved will be 
relatively small in comparison to the trade-related capacity needs of low-income 
countries. The available research suggests that the transfers needed to offset lost 
preferences are not large relative to either the overall gains of an ambitious Doha 
Round or current official development assistance—presently in the $70 billion range. 
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Account should also be taken of the commitment by OECD countries in Monterrey to 
double official development assistance spending and attain the 0.7 percent of GDP 
target.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Preference erosion is a significant economic issue for a number of countries. It is also a 
bilateral issue, suggesting that the countries and trading blocs that reduce the value of 
past preferential access commitments should offer transfers to the affected countries. 
We have argued in this paper that compensation for losses should take place outside 
the WTO so as to make the trading system less distorted. Avoiding additional new 
preferences and distortions in the trading system is a key reason to address preference 
erosion explicitly and separately. This will not imply the end of discrimination—many 
low-income countries will benefit from continued assistance to achieve export 
development and diversification objectives. Thus, the focus of this paper on reducing 
the use of distorting trade policy instruments and placing the emphasis on other 
mechanisms, including financial assistance to target more directly the factors that 
constrain trade capacity. The associated resources should be allocated through the 
multilateral channels that have been established to provide funds for trade-related 
priorities identified by developing countries. 
Specifically, there is a political economy case that prospective losses generated 
by MFN liberalization should be quantified on a bilateral basis, using methods that 
estimate what the associated transfer should have been and ignoring the potential 
impact of offsetting measures. A bilateral analysis generates the best measure of the 
value that should be attached to preference programs for “compensation” purposes. 
That is, even though compliance costs and the incidence of rents are important 
determinants of the value of preferences, they should be ignored as they substantially 
reduce the real value of the programs and thus go against the purported objectives that 
motivate them.  
Binding commitments could be sought—as part of a Doha Round agreement—to 
undertake such assessments and to transfer equivalent financial resources to the 
affected countries. If so, these funds should be earmarked for the relevant recipient   26
developing countries, and delivered through existing aid channels, with the ultimate 
uses of the funds determined by the governments concerned, based on a policy agenda 
for trade and growth that is consistent with a country’s development strategy. Own trade 
reforms and complementary investments and measures to reduce transactions costs, 
improve the investment climate, and enhance productivity and competitiveness of 
farmers and firms are needed to deal with the adjustment costs associated with erosion 
losses. But such costs go far beyond the erosion of preferences. More assistance is 
needed more generally to bolster the capacity to exploit trade opportunities. In the 
process, the negative effects of preference erosion will be attenuated, and, as 
important, those countries that have proven unable to benefit from existing or past 
programs could be assisted in attaining the original objective of trade preference 
programs—export development and diversification. 
Solutions to preference erosion should be multilateral in the sense that the 
financial transfers that are called for are best allocated through existing multilateral aid 
mechanisms as opposed to bilateral ones. There are a number of arguments for this, 
including aid effectiveness and the fact that preference erosion is just one of many 
potential shocks and opportunities that will confront developing countries. Rather than 
seek to create a stand-alone fund to compensate for erosion of preferences—whether 
inside or outside the WTO—it is more efficient and effective to integrate funding to offset 
preference erosion into the broader “aid for trade” effort—arguably the more important 
need (Prowse 2005). 
A broader “aid for trade” effort would also allow the objectives of preferences to 
be pursued more effectively and across a broader group of countries—by recognizing 
that market access is not the most important variable constraining export growth in 
many developing economies. Dealing with the supply side constraints will require funds 
(investments), but also the adoption of policies that address specific government and 
market failures that prevent a supply response from emerging. As argued in the recent 
literature, although the case for trade policies in this context is very weak, what types of 
domestic policies might be most appropriate and effective may not be obvious, 
suggesting that experimentation and learning should be encouraged (Rodrik, 2004). 
This suggests there is a link between the aid for trade agenda and the issues of “policy   27
flexibility” and “special and differential treatment” in the WTO (and regional) trade 
agreements. Given the presumption that trade policy cannot do much to address the 
sources of market and government failure that impede supply responses, international 
cooperation (trade agreements) can help by creating institutional mechanisms to help 
identify what policies would be effective and efficient in attaining specific goals set by 
governments, and by increasing the transparency of policies and their effects 
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